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Obama’s Alliances1
 Steven Casey
INTRODUCTION
In the age of Obama, the United States’ commitment to its extensive alliance system appears, at first glance, to be shaky. America is beset by economic problems and domestic preoccupations. Its 
hegemonic position is under threat, especially from a rapidly growing China. It remains mired in a 
war on terror in which, from Washington’s perspective, many allies have not done enough. And it 
is led by a president who talks about embracing alternative forms of international arrangements.
During his successful election campaign, Obama evinced few sentimental feelings for old arrangements 
that were originally formed to deter the long-gone communist threat. His pledge ‘to rebuild the alliances, 
partnerships, and institutions necessary to confront common threats and enhance common security’ 
implied that alliances were no longer a sui generis type of institutional arrangement. They were set 
for a downgrade. 
Almost three years into his presidency, however, President Obama has proved much more alliance-friendly 
than candidate Obama. This is partly because he knows that he needs alliance support to wage costly 
fights in Afghanistan and Libya. But it is due, above all, to the changing contours of international politics, 
particularly in Asia and the Pacific, where China’s rise has concentrated Obama’s mind, prodding him 
to think about ways to both engage with and balance this strategic competitor.
WHY US ALLIANCES STILL MATTER TO THE WORLD
Although most US alliances were born during the distant days of the Cold War, for at least four reasons 
they still matter. First, although power shifts may ultimately remould US alliance structures, these changes 
will not suddenly consign Washington to the margins – not while America still retains the largest economy 
and the biggest military. Second, if the United States is itself in decline, then Washington is likely to 
cling even more firmly to its alliances, as declining powers are even more likely than global hegemons 
to seek out partners in order to share defensive burdens. Third, the United States remains an attractive 
partner, especially for those states who share both a strategic outlook and similar values. Finally, since 
1945 the United States has placed a high priority on the credibility of its alliance networks. Successive 
administrations have been convinced that deterrence requires projecting an image of resolve and have 
worried about a home-front backlash if they appear to let down an ally. This concern for appearances 
is likely to continue in the future. 
In short, the United States has placed enormous emphasis on its allies, on occasion even seeing them as 
a motive – rather than just the method – for action. At a time when many other states view America in 
decline, it is likely that, if anything, Washington will be even more determined to keep up appearances, 
standing firmly behind allies to demonstrate to rivals that it still means business.
1 This article is extracted from a longer paper produced for the Lowy Institute for International Policy, www.lowyinstitute.org
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OBAMA’S CONCEPTION OF ALLIANCES
Since his sudden arrival on the national scene in 
2008, Obama has promised change. One reason is his 
background. Obama is not simply the first black man 
elected to America’s highest office. He is also the first 
president of Kenyan ancestry, the first born in Hawaii, 
and the first raised partly in Indonesia. ‘The Pacific 
Rim has helped shape my view’, Obama declared not 
long after taking office. His mental map, he thereby 
implied, was far removed from the Eurocentric focus 
of so many of his predecessors.
Obama, moreover, is self-consciously part of a new, 
post-Cold War generation, which came of age after 
the collapse of communism and in the midst of the 
war on terrorism. ‘I am probably the first president’, 
he told one interviewer in July 2010, ‘who is young 
enough that the Vietnam War wasn’t at the core 
of my development. So I grew up with none of the 
baggage that arose out of the dispute of the Vietnam 
War’. A lot of the Cold War ‘political frames’, Obama 
added, ‘don’t really connect with me generationally’.
Nor did Obama connect with the political frames 
that President George W. Bush devised to wage the 
so-called ‘war on terror’. To win his party nomination 
in 2008, Obama had to appeal to a Democratic base 
that was clearly committed to foreign-policy liberalism, 
and categorically rejected the ideas behind Bush’s war 
on terror. To win the election, he then tried to turn 
the campaign into a referendum on the Bush years – 
albeit a caricatured version of those years – stressing 
the ills of unilateralism during the long war in Iraq.
Against this personal and political backdrop, it is 
scarcely surprising that Obama’s 2008 conception of 
alliances appeared to be both new and liberal. 
He argued that in a world of complex interdependence, 
the United States needed to look beyond traditional 
tools such as security alliances. Instead, the new 
president would have to work more closely with 
emerging powers such as India, Brazil, and Indonesia. 
He would have to improve America’s relations with 
multilateral institutions such as ASEAN and the African 
Union. And he would have to create new international 
regimes, such as a Shared Security Partnership Program, 
to root out global terrorist networks. 
To the conservative retort that multiplying such 
arrangements would constrain American choices, 
Obama’s view was clear: the advantages of playing 
a leading role in a complex network of bilateral and 
multilateral, formal and informal arrangements, 
far outweigh any drawbacks. ‘America is strongest 
when we act alongside strong partners’, Obama 
declared. ‘We helped create the UN – not to constrain 
America’s influence, but to amplify it by advancing 
our values’. Obama also argued that the United States 
has a vested interest in upholding international rules 
– rather than, as Bush did, challenging them. The 
reason is simple: hegemons tend to create rules and 
institutions that support its dominance, and allow it 
to wield power legitimately, subtly, and affordably. 
In his 2006 book, The Audacity of Hope, he insisted 
that ‘nobody benefits more than we do from the 
observance of international “rules of the road.” We 
can’t win converts to those rules if we act as if they 
apply to everyone but us. When the world’s sole 
superpower willingly restrains its power and abides by 
internationally agreed-upon standards of conduct, it 
sends a message that these are rules worth following’.
While Obama’s campaign rhetoric was clearly on 
the liberal end of the spectrum, Obama was keen to 
emphasise that it was not entirely new. This was vital. 
His personal background is so exotic that his more 
extreme critics have accused him of espousing policies 
that border on un-American. And even moderate 
Republicans have argued that he ‘has embraced the 
foreign policy of an ideologue’. In this view, Obama’s 
framework is based on a ‘repudiation of American 
global leadership, a devaluation of alliances, and a 
penchant for paper agreements’. Obama, these critics 
add, is heir to an excessively idealistic Democratic 
tradition that dates back, if not to Woodrow Wilson’s 
attempt to remake the world in 1919, then at least to 
George McGovern and Jimmy Carter’s naïve liberalism, 
which was decisively repudiated in the elections of 
1972 and 1980.
In response Obama has sought to place himself in the 
illustrious Democratic heritage of Roosevelt, Truman, 
and Kennedy. Take his faith in the importance and 
efficacy of international rules. Some critics argue that 
this is one of the more naïve and novel elements of 
Obama’s foreign-policy creed, but it is, in fact, perfectly 
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in tune with how most Cold War-era presidents viewed 
friends and enemies in the international system. 
Similarly, Obama’s interest in multilateral arrangements 
to deal with these complex challenges likewise fits with 
what his Democratic forebears tried to achieve, from 
Roosevelt’s attempts to turn the wartime alliance into 
‘a political society of nations’ to Kennedy’s efforts to 
tackle economic and social problems in Latin America 
through his Alliance for Progress.
Yet while Obama may sit comfortably within the liberal 
mould, he is also a pragmatist. More importantly, he 
also inherited a number of awkward realities that 
have cast long shadows over what he can achieve 
on the international stage. One has been the budget 
deficit, which has placed him in a different position 
from his Cold War Democratic heroes, Truman and 
Kennedy. These earlier presidents had both approached 
alliances from a position of confidence about American 
strength. And they were in no doubt that the United 
States could afford not only to mobilise its own military 
power but also to cement certain crucial alliances with 
lavish economic and military aid. Obama has had no 
such luxury. His position is, in fact, closer to (although 
much worse than) the Republican administrations of 
Eisenhower and Nixon, who saw alliances largely as 
a way of sharing costly defence burdens at a time of 
domestic retrenchment. 
As well as these chastened circumstances, Obama’s 
early actions were also driven by another unavoidable 
reality Obama inherited from President Bush: the so-
called ‘war on terror’.
ALLIES AND THE WAR ON TERROR
On the campaign trail, Obama had stressed that the 
war in Iraq (America’s war of choice) had greatly 
distracted Washington’s attention from the more 
important battleground in Afghanistan (America’s war 
of necessity). Once in power, Obama had to figure 
out how to interact with two governments at the 
very heart of the struggle: Afghanistan, where the 
long-standing war continued, and Pakistan, where 
many of the terrorist training camps had now shifted. 
Although neither are allies in the formal sense 
(Washington instead uses the term ‘cooperative 
relationship’), making these relationships work 
was Obama’s initial priority. Doing so would enable 
Afghanistan to take over more of the fight against 
the Taliban, and encourage Pakistan to confront the 
terrorist networks inside its borders. But Obama has 
been frustrated on both counts. There is certainly 
little trust between Washington and Kabul, especially 
when Afghan President Hamid Karzai is so publicly 
critical of American operations inside Afghanistan. 
And Obama has become increasingly suspicious of 
Pakistan’s ambivalent attitude towards terror cells 
within its borders. By the spring of 2011 Washington’s 
frustration verged on outright resentment. Most 
notably, Obama sanctioned the operation against 
Osama bin Laden without informing Pakistan, because 
he suspected his partner would tip off his target. 
At the same time, Obama has tried to prod America’s 
long-standing allies throughout the world to help 
share the burden in Afghanistan. In the wake of his 
decision to send 30,000 more troops, US officials 
worked to get these allies to increase their own 
involvement, in what Clinton called ‘a crucial test 
for NATO’. Again, however, Obama was frustrated. 
This was partly because after the Bush years many 
allies face publics who are sceptical about following 
Washington’s lead. But Obama’s own laidback style 
has also contributed. Distancing himself from his 
swaggering predecessor, Obama has not been the 
type of president to pressure America’s allies into 
sending more troops to an unpopular war. 
ALLIES AND THE ARAB SPRING
While ‘AfPak’ occupied Obama’s attention in 2009, 
the Arab Spring was an unexpected shock that 
suddenly directed his focus to the Middle East in 
2011. As the contagion of protest spread, toppling 
or threatening governments that had long been a 
fixture of the region, Obama faced the prospect of 
prioritising America’s declared support for freedom 
and democracy at the risk of losing stable autocratic 
leaders who had been steadfast allies.  Obama was 
initially uncertain and clumsy. But the administration 
eventually developed a response characterised 
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by caution and hard-headed liberalism. The US 
waited weeks before calling on Mubarak to leave 
and months before unveiling a general approach to 
the region. Both policies, when they finally came, 
demonstrated Obama’s liberal inclinations. His May 
2011 speech was the high point, with its emphasis 
on embracing the democratic change reverberating 
through the Middle East. At one point, Obama 
even suggested a new Marshall Plan for the region. 
The death of bin Laden, he claimed, together with 
the emergence of democratic movements, presented 
the United States with an opportunity to help the 
region’s reformers by extending debt relief and 
enterprise funds. 
Yet on close inspection, the scale of such aid will 
be nothing like the Marshall Plan billions of the late 
1940s, not in America’s straitened circumstances. 
And Obama’s liberalism has other limits, too. He has 
continued to emphasise American ‘humility’ – letting 
the protests find their own solutions, without overt 
prodding from Washington. He has remained content 
to react to events, rather than seeking like Bush to 
drive the democratising process forward. Above all, 
his actions have been decidedly uneven. Like many 
of his predecessors, Obama has found it easier to 
get tough with states who are not friends: hence the 
bombing of Libya and the sanctions against Syria. 
But he has treated allies quite differently. Bahrain, for 
instance, which provides an important base for the 
US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, has merely been subjected to 
gentle presidential pleas to open up a dialogue with 
its domestic opposition.
Despite this selective soft-pedalling, Obama’s 
actions have had an unsettling impact on America’s 
surviving allies in the region. Saudi officials were 
clearly angry at Obama’s abandonment of Mubarak, 
telling reporters that their government’s willingness 
to listen to the President had now ‘evaporated’. 
Israel appeared equally concerned, fretting that a 
post-Mubarak government would be much more 
hostile and worrying that Obama had proven 
himself fundamentally flaky towards key partners. 
Small wonder that Obama’s push for renewed dialogue 
between Israel and the Palestinians was met with a 
cold response from Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.
If the Arab Spring has had a complex – and often 
debilitating – impact on America’s traditional allies in 
the Middle East, its Libyan component has shown how 
he would like alliance relations to develop, while also 
making him a sporadic Atlanticist. In Libya, Obama 
was keen to let other states and organisations play the 
key role, ceding command responsibilities to NATO as 
a way of demonstrating that the United States was 
no longer the hectoring hegemon. Above all, he was 
animated by an acute awareness of the domestic 
constraints of war weariness and empty federal coffers. 
In this sense, Obama revived an old American tradition 
of using allies – and especially European allies – as 
proxies to wage war when the United States is either 
unwilling or unable to take the lead. Recent events 
indicate this approach has produced results while 
minimising the risks and costs to the United States.
ALLIES IN ASIA
While Obama has been forced to direct most of his 
attention to Central Asia and the Middle East, he 
hoped to focus on the Asia-Pacific region. According 
to one well-placed reporter, Obama and his national 
security adviser, Thomas E. Donilon, believe the United 
States needs ‘to rebuild its reputation, extricate itself 
from the Middle East and Afghanistan, and turn its 
attention toward Asia and China’s unchecked influence 
in the region. America was “overweighted” in 
the former and “underweighted” in the latter, 
[according to] Donilon’.
Asia is certainly the region where Obama seemed 
keenest to emphasise developing new partners and 
institutions, albeit not always in a manner that is a total 
break from past American practice. Take ASEAN. Under 
Bush, the United States’ approach to ASEAN’s Regional 
Forum (ARF) – ASEAN’s effort to develop a regional 
multilateral security regime – had been standoffish. 
Obama was determined to reverse this indifference. 
‘America is a Pacific nation’, he declared in July 2009, 
that ‘understands the importance of Asia in the 21st 
century’. It would therefore play an ‘aggressive role 
in engaging’ with ASEAN and the region. 
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As well as deepening US involvement with such 
institutions, Obama also appeared to prioritise the 
forging of new relationships with emerging powers, 
such as Indonesia. His 2010 National Security 
Strategy (NSS) depicted Indonesia not simply as a 
friend on traditional security issues and the war on 
terror; rather, it was now ‘an increasingly important 
partner on regional and transnational issues such as 
climate change, counterterrorism, maritime security, 
peacekeeping, and disaster relief’. ‘With tolerance, 
resilience, and multiculturalism as core values’, the 
NSS concluded, ‘Indonesia is uniquely positioned to 
help address challenges facing the developing world’.
It would be wrong to conclude from Obama’s embrace 
of multilateral institutions and emerging powers in 
Asia, however, that he sees traditional alliances as 
redundant. Despite his pre-presidential talk of working 
towards a nuclear-free world, he soon had to respond 
to North Korean’s second nuclear test. Increasingly, he 
also fretted about China. Although economic interests 
continue to push the United States in the direction 
of engagement with Beijing, Obama has become 
increasingly concerned about China – both its growing 
military capabilities and a number of bellicose actions.
As a result, Obama has had a major incentive to 
strengthen old Asian alliance commitments. ‘America’s 
treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, 
Thailand, and the Philippines’, he declared in 2009, 
‘are not historical documents from a bygone era, 
but abiding commitments to each other that are 
fundamental to our shared security’. In response 
both to North Korea’s nuclear test and Japan’s unease 
about the strength of Obama’s resolve, he pledged 
a ‘continuing commitment of extended deterrence, 
including the US nuclear umbrella’ to defend South 
Korea. Obama’s Pentagon has also given Australia 
a larger place in its mental map. In November 2010 
the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations 
(AUSMIN) decided to establish a force posture working 
group to explore enhanced joint defence cooperation. 
In public, both Washington and Canberra deny they are 
seeking to balance against China. But off the record, 
officials admit that the US-Australian discussions now 
revolve around ‘the rise of China and, as China rises, 
what sort of force it is going to be in the world’. From 
the summer of 2009 North Korean sabre rattling has 
pushed him towards a firmer embrace of America’s 
East Asian allies. In the summer of 2009, for instance, 
CONCLUSION
The founders of America’s modern alliance system 
were hard-headed liberals. Like Obama, Roosevelt and 
Truman recognised the importance of alliances to meet 
international threats. Also like Obama, these hard-
headed liberals often had a crowded policy agenda. 
With their ambitious domestic agendas, Roosevelt, 
Truman, and now Obama, have each been vulnerable 
to the charge of giving insufficient attention to certain 
parts of the world. 
Yet, ultimately, overriding security threats drove these 
presidents towards forging and maintaining strong 
alliance networks. Although this in turn often meant 
giving a lower priority to issues closer to their heart, 
such as economic modernisation, their liberalism also 
left them well placed to manage alliances. True, they 
might often be distracted. They might also pursue 
certain policies that make their allies uncomfortable. 
But with their basic belief that alliances empower 
rather than constrain, and their willingness to listen as 
well as lead, they have all left America’s alliances in a 
stronger position. Obama fits snugly in this tradition.■
